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For contemporaries, probably the most striking feature of 1789 was its suddenness 
and completeness. In a matter of a few months, the most powerful monarchy in the 
European world, the wealthiest aristocracy, the most complex institutional apparatus, the 
most sophisticated hierarchy, crumbled, disappeared- and all without significant loss of 
blood. If it hadn't been 1789, and if they hadn't been brought up to use different 
linguistic protocols, the writers and talkers of the time might have called it all a miracle, a 
clear instance of the particular workings of Providence; Mirabeau or Lafayette or even 
Louis XVI himself might have been dubbed 'the Great Deliverer', the 'man of God's 
right hand', the instrument of God's benign purpose, as had William of Orange on a 
similarly bloodless and seemingly miraculous occasion (frequently compared to the 
events of 1789) a century earlier.! But, it was 1789. And the form of explanation was 
fundamentally different. 
Revolutions are, of course, literary events also, and the crumbling of the French state 
was saturated by words, in print, in conversations and in political meetings. The 
linguistic explosion was almost as striking as the revolutionary circumstances the writers 
and speakers grappled with, the new order they tried to explain. Groups hitherto 
politically inarticulate were suddenly invited to list their grievances so that the good king 
could put them right. The result was a collection of complaints and aspirations so 
complicated and voluminous that it still defies the computer. Newspapers and periodicals, 
few in number, subject to the vagiaries of ancien regime censorship, devoted in the main 
(as Mornet2 demonstrated) to belles lettres and science, made way for a deluge of 
politics; political clubs proliferated at every level; electoral, communal, sectional 
assemblies seemed to meet almost continuously; the various National Assemblies- the 
'Constituant', the 'Legislative', and the 'Convention' - leant their enormous prestige to 
the rhetoric of Revolution. Some words quickly became taboo, mhers sacred: reading 
simple place names became 'a silent course in ethics'; and uttering terms like 'patrie' 
,'nation', 'regeneration', 'virtue', 'terror', a son of revolutionary catechism. It is not too 
much to claim that the most striking and perhaps the most lasting legacy of the Revolution 
is indeed its new language of politics: 'its linguisticality', writes Lynn Hunt, 'is its most 
revealing aspect; its linguistic functions, its linguistic structure and its linguistic status are 
its most disclosive attributes' .3 
Until recently, Revolutionary discourse has not received its proper attention: language 
has usually been treated as a a screen rather than a sign. Terms like virtue, for example, 
have made most historians uncornfonable: 'virtue', they have argued, must stand for 
something else. The opponents of the Revolution from Burke onwards had always 
argued that such language was invariably a hypocritical cloak, the tool of scoundrels or 
less frequently the self-delusion of fools. Marx devoted some of his most celebrated 
pages to what he called the masquerades or camouflages of Revolutionary language; and 
writers like Soboul or Poulantzas - more reductionist than their master - have written off 
the moral idioms or the rhetorical tropes of the Revolutionaries as mere ideology or false 
consciousness. Alben Soboul, for instance, sees in the 'vinue' invoked by Robespierre 
and St Just an instance of their pre-bourgeois intellectual limitations: 'incapable of 
analyzing the economic and social conditions of their time ... they believed in appeals to 
vinue'. Similarly, for Poulantzas, the terrorist idiom of the 'Pere Duchesne' was little 
more then 'a plebian manner to put an end to the enemies of the bougeoisie'.4 For their 
pan, revisionists like Cobban or Cobb, yet more materialist than the materialism they 
denounce, more caught in the polarization of the illusory and the real, simply don't bother 
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with what they regard as mere rhetoric, consciously or unconsciously designed to 
disguise special pleading or personal point-scoring.5 Even Francois Furet who takes the 
language of the Revolution seriously, argues that it was a sort of unstable stopgap 
tailored to fit the collapse of institutional forms and the consequent struggle for the 
appropriation of public opinion. Language was a particular instance of what Furet calls 
'the illusion of the political': 'the serrtiotic circuit is the absolute master of politics'.6 The 
veil holds the secret of the revolutionary process, but it is nonetheless, says Furet, a veil. 
And Lynn Hunt who more than any other writer has rescued the language and symbols of 
the Revolution from epiphenomenal limbo, would stop short of wishing to establish them 
as the Revolution's most lasting legacy, as 'an enduring shift in political culture'.? 
Inevitably, perhaps, the new rhetoric of politics was not entirely new. It was 
borrowed rather from the literary models of the Enlightenment. Let us take a typical trope 
- in this case from that old philosophic war horse, the Encyclopaedia itself. In the 
famous prelirrtinary discourse, d'Alembert provides the philosophic movement with a 
pedigree and a legitimation. We are probably, all of us, farrtiliar with its language and 
symbols: the darkness of ignorance and superstition, the gradual dawn of a new light, its 
application, thanks to a few great men, throughout the sciences and the arts and its 
eventual and inevitable diffusion into every field of political and social behaviour - a 
stirring story full of violent and heroic metaphors: the breaking of chains, the rending of 
veils, the clashing of doctrines, the storming of citadels. 
Descartes dared to show intelligent rrtinds how to throw off the yoke 
of scholasticism, of opinion, of authority - in a word of prejudice and 
barbarism ..... He can be thought of as a leader who, before anyone 
else, had the courage to rise up against a despotic and arbitrary power 
and who in preparing a resounding revolution, laid the foundations of 
a more just and happier government which he himself was not able to 
see established. 8 
The European Enlightenment had identified traditionality in its various guises -
intolerance, absurdity, superstition and ignorance - as the major obstacle, the 
ubiquitous enemy, in its battle for a more rational and more just social and political order. 
Under the soubriquet of the 'ancien regime' were subsumed practices and beliefs which 
had been unreflectingly accepted for generations, legitimated by nothing more than habit 
or inertia, and for that reason alone a scandal to those who thought it necessary for every 
institution to be placed under the scrutiny of reason. But in addition, and inevitably, the 
'sleep of reason' brought forth more substantive monsters: powerful and intolerant 
churches, supposedly sacred and patriarchal rulers, an arrogant wealthy and unproductive 
nobility, a steep and disjunctive hierarchy of deference, an irrational and unjust legal 
system, a 'feudal regime' all of which had to be 'abolished for ever'.9 But when 
traditionality yielded to rationality and scientific knowledge, all the vices it sustained 
would vanish - like, in a favourite metaphor of 'les lumieres', the mists of night at 
sunrise. Light would be diffused through the method of rational and critical analysis, 
through reducing words to things, separating wholes into their constituent parts, through 
eschewing prejudice and habit, through 'de-mystification', through what J. S. Mill was 
to call the language and syntax of subversion.lO Over and again during the late 
eighteenth century the sign systems of Enlightenment had been borrowed by 
parlementaires in their parochial struggles against 'despotic ministers' or by those same 
reforming ministers in their efforts to galvanize a society riddled with 'gothic prejudices'. 
Little cause for wonder then that this should spill over into 1789 and beyond. 
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But this paper is not just about the language but also about the myth of the Revolution. 
And perhaps I had better characterize my use of this much used word. Quite simply, like 
Donald Horne in "The Public Culture" , I take 'myth' to refer to 'a belief held in 
common by a large group of people that gives events and actions a particular meaning'. 
Myths go to the heart of things, describe things 'as they really are', events 'as they really 
happened', but in a way which is sharper and more dramatic than a description of the 
circumference or surface of things and events can ever convey. Myths have a magic or a 
talismanic ability to heighten and transform the prosiac or the mundane, infusing ordinary 
existence with dramatic meaning and significance. Myths, as I shall use them in this 
paper, are particularly effective as explanations and legitimations of political action. More 
precisely, they provide their users with an accepted 'Charter of Foundation' with which 
they may align their behaviour or offer them an 'imagined identity' which claims their 
allegiance and which conveys special collective meaning and purpose for their activities. 
Myths and their attendant rituals and icons, are complex and high voltage shorthands of 
political language and behaviour. Their constant and consistent use gains them 
widespread social acceptance and places them in Eco's category of the 'overcoded': 
'given a code assigning meaning to certain minimal expressions, overcoding (assigns) 
additional meanings to more macroscopic strings of these expressions' .11 
The European Enlightenment stands before us decked out in the language of rationality 
and de-mythologizing. But I would like to suggest - and Foucault has argued the point at 
length 12- that it presents a particularly sharp example of myth making. The central myth 
of the Enlightenment is, of course, to be found in Sarastro's Temple, 13 in what one 
might call the solar myth of light triumphing over darkness, reason and wisdom rolling 
back the clouds of superstition and ignorance, justice overruling arbitrary caprice. 
Sarastro's Temple simply dramatizes and presents as narrative the metaphors and the 
rhetoric tropes we have already mentioned: 
Nature and Nature's Laws lay hid from sight, 
God said let Newton be and all was Light 
Science had torn down the veils of ignorance and superstition in one area of human 
thought, held a mirror to nature and showed things 'as they really were'; scientific 
politics or economics, moral Newtonism would accomplish it throughout the whole of 
life.14 
The myth is adopted wholesale in the iconography and rhetoric of the Revolution. 
Think of all those geometrical mausoleums, the cylinders, cubes, cones and spheres of 
Boullee and Ledoux, many of them dedicated to the great Newton; think of the accent on 
clear lines, open space ('Revolutionary intensity', said Ballaud-Varenne, one of the 
Committee of Public Safety, 'can only be exercised in a free space, which is why the 
Legislator clears the road of everything that is an obstacle'15). Or consider the following 
of Sieyes and Robespierre (and, believe me, they are characteristic): 
In the dark ages of barbarism and feudalism it was possible to 
destroy true relations among men, to sow disorder in every nation, 
and to corrupt all justice; but now that daylight is rising, all gothic 
absurdities must flee, all remnants of ancient ferocity must crumble 
and die. That much is certain. 
Everything has changed in the physical order (thanks to the conquests 
of science); everything must change in the moral and political order. 
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Half the world's revolution is already complete; the other half must 
be accomplished.16 
And yet, particularly in Robespierre and the men of the Convention, there is a 
difference of tone and message. The tone is urgent, imperative. The language and 
mythology of Enlightenment is both dramatized and qualified. Briefly, (and I have no 
time to go into this) I would suggest that this is the result of a panicular type of self-
identification associated, in the first instance, with their penchant for antique and 
especially Roman models which enabled them to see themselves as actors in pre-existing 
roles. Their schooling in the rhetorical skills of Cicero and Quintillian was almost too 
faithfully reflected in their speeches; and their intensive and passionate reading of Cicero, 
Sallust and Plutarch turned many of them, on their own self-assessment, into ardent 
Republicans 'without their ever dreaming of becoming one' .17 The Roman ism of the 
Revolution is usually treated as a rather comic instance of amateur dramatics. But politics 
is theatre and what matters in theatre - as every student of Stanislavsky knows - is not 
whether the role is real or unreal, but whether one believes in it, makes it one's own. 
This is what was different about 1789 and 1848. The men of '48 were play acting; those 
of '79 and '92 were swallowed up in their roles. Marx (whose famous pages from 'The 
Eighteenth Brumaire' deserve more careful reading than they are usually accorded), is 
apposite here: 
The raising of the dead ... served to glorify new struggles, not to 
parody the old; it fostered in imagination an aggrandizement of the set 
task, not flight from its actual solution, a rediscovery of the spirit of 
revolution rather than a summoning up of its ghost.18 
Enlightenment, moreover, is not a natural and benign process, a radiance which 
spreads of its own accord; it involves also, an act of will, a struggle increasingly 
uncertain, increasingly imperilled. Enlightenment, said Kant, was 'daring to know' 
(sapere aude ), learning how to grow up, how to escape the leading strings of infancy. 
Enlightenment traced a human projectory from nonage to maturity. But the will to 
knowledge came from within. Tamino, you may remember, had to undergo rites of 
initiation, of purification, had to will his liberation. Here Rousseau is crucial: not his 
political programme which - if it ever existed - few of the Revolutionaries knew and 
which never had the qualities or effects attributed to it by writers like Talmon or 
Crocker, 19 but his concern with the authentic moral persona and its creation - the 
Rousseau of 'The Confessions' and the 'Nouvelle Heloise". Enlighenment comes from 
within not without, not from the radiance diffused by scientists and philosophers, but 
from the inner light, from the simplicity and innocence of the human heart. It is the 
emanation of one's integral self, the expression of one's total identity, an identity, 
unconstrained, uncontaminated, and, yes, virtuous. 
Living in a society he saw as hopelessly superficial and meaningless, Rousseau was 
overcome with a sense of loss. All of his writing was in a sense concerned with bridging 
the gap between the unitary self and his fragmented environment, with the restitution of 
'transparence'. Traditional society imposed 'ascribed' conditions on people, refused to 
recognize them as moral or social agents, treated them as inferiors, children, objects of 
pity or of patronage. Avant-garde life in great cities offered intellectuals like himself 
freedom from such social bonds or pscychic chains only to enslave them to fashion; 
allowed them to be themselves, only to dislocate them, force them apart, drive them into 
insincerity, into assuming the 'masks' of conventional social discourse. A misfit, so he 
believed, through historical circumstance not through disposition, through distortions 
imposed on him from outside, not from the virtue and purity which came from within, 
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Rousseau longed to achieve that ecstasy of 'unmediated, unobstructed communication 
with others which he achieved in communion with himself and nature', he yearned for 
the recovery in the moral community of that meaningful order which reposed in natural 
man.20 
The cult of Rousseau dramatized, individualized and democratized the myth of 
Enlightenment, turned it from an external process into an inner spiritual drama. In this 
sense - and only in this sense - the Revolution may be termed 'Rousseauist'. The 
Revolution actualizes the unity/identity which Jean-Jacques craved, transposes 
Rousseau's purely personal and abstract fabrications into collective and concrete and 
hence mythic forms: through a series of linguistic devices - the Nation, the patrie , 
citizenship, the will of the people - it creates an 'imagined' moral community. The Terror 
becomes on a political level homologous with what unfolds on the psychic level in the 
writings ofRousseau.21 To safeguard its virtue, its purity, its innocence it must attribute 
evil to the plots formed by its enemies. 
Rousseau depicted in strokes of flame the channs of virtue ... The 
purity of his doctrine, imbibed from nature and from a profound 
hatred of vice as well as his invincible contempt for the scheming 
intriguers who usurped the name of philosophers called forth the 
hatred and persecution of his rivals and false friends. Ah! Had he 
been the witness of this Revolution of which he was the precursor, 
who can doubt that his generous soul would have embraced the cause 
of justice and equality with transports of joy. But what did his 
cowardly adversaries do? They fought against the Revolution.22 
- thus Robespierre in his final appraisal of the work of the philosophes, delivered to the 
Jacobin Club some two months before his death. 
The central myths of the Revolution, in other words, combine the instrumentalism of 
the Enlightenment with the expressivism of Romanticism: the belief in a Temple of 
Sarastro, in an objective rational order which provides all the answers, with the 
conviction that it must be built with pure hands and unsullied hearts, formed by an act of 
will of those who through virtue and innocence, through rites of initiation and 
purification, will inhabit it. They revolve around the interplay of what I call 'Foundation 
myths' which have to be re-defined and 'myths of identity' which have to be re-enacted. 
To begin with, of course, one had to cast out the old: by 1789, in fact, this was not so 
difficult. For the past century, France had been beset by what has been referred to in 
another context as a struggle over the criterion of authority. Crown and noble apologists 
had battled with each other for decades over the origins of the French race and their 
consequent over-riding absolutist claims or sacrosanct immemorial privileges. And by a 
nice irony, not unfamiliar in the history of ideas, the largely discredited scholarship of 
'the noble thesis' came to be orthodox political and social rationalization on the eve of the 
Revolution. Authoritative absolutism had already died. But privilege was vulnerable also. 
Often, conflict within a ruling class over the differing historical credentials of rival 
factions can bring to life radical myths hostile to both; for with the fragmentation of a 
single authoritative past, the radical can appeal to a tradition which is anterior to the 
tradition of his or her rulers: 'When Adam delv'd and Eve span, who was then the 
gentleman'; or in the version of 1789: 
The Third Estate has nothing to fear from going back to the past. It 
will refer back to the year preceding the conquest .... Why should it 
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not send back to the forests of Franconia, all those families who cling 
to the mad claim that they are descended from the race of conquerors 
and have inherited their rights? Thus purified, the nation will easily 
console itself, I believe for no longer imagining itself composed only 
of descendants of Gauls and Romans'.23 
'When a people rebels against its divinities, its first act is to break their images'.24 
Iconoclasm was central to the rhetoric of the Enlightenment; and no event symbolized the 
overthrow of 'Gothic' barbarity and royal despotism more completely than the capture of 
the Bastille. The image of the prison- the tomb of holy liberty, the cage of the intellect, 
the place of vengeance, of silence, of incarceration - was especially strong in the 
eighteenth century: think of Piranese, of Beccaria, or the hundreds of works from 
Linguet's Mernoires onwards in the 1780s and '90s devoted to the Bastille, to the man in 
the iron mask, or to the cages especially designed, it was said, by the Spider King, Louis 
XI.25 And always the same images: the evil monster, the devouring Minotaur, the 
uneasy giant, the fogotten prisoner. 26 
Serene and blessed Liberty for the first time' (wrote the "Revolutions 
de Paris") has at last been introduced into this abode of horrors, this 
frightful refuge of monstrous despotism and its crimes. 27 
Michelet was doing no more than paraphrasing contemporary myth-making when he 
wrote of the events of July 14th in the language of legend: 
Correctly speaking the Bastille was not taken; it surrendered. 
Troubled by a bad conscience, it went mad and lost all presence of 
mind.28 
And all of this, of course, to describe the tragi-comedy of the crowd searching for arms 
and gunpowder, alarming and confusing a jumpy and incompetent Governor and his 
semi-retired gua!:,d, storming the citadel and freeing its 7 prisoners (4 counterfeiters, 2 
madmen and I sadist)! Yet, of course, Michelet was right: the Bastille was a symbol of 
despotism and its destruction an event acclaimed throughout the civilized world. The 
storming of the Bastille was the key Foundation myth of the Revolution, the crucial 
source of its legitimacy, the first of its popular rituals of insurrection. Revolutions, one 
does not have to be reminded, are 'the carnival of the oppressed'. And one can't have a 
carnival without frreworks.29 
The destruction of 'the feudal regime' had much of the same quality of contemporary 
fabrication. Feudalism, a term coined by the philosophes to describe a confused welter 
of residues: a bewildering and bastardized social reality focussing around seigneurial 
dues, subsistence peasant farming characterized by a form of sharecropping known as 
'metayage', a form of government otherwise called 'Gothic', featuring the breakdown of 
central authority and its replacement by countless local jurisdictions, a racial theory of 
nobility formulated by Boulainvilliers, reformulated by Montesquieu in the language of 
political sociology as the cornerstone of anti-despotism, and despite its rickety history, 
well established in the repertoire of 'parlementary' rhetoric by 1789, and a more 
generalized regime of privilege standing for the system of estates, compartments, grades, 
distinctions: some or all of this was 'for ever abolished' in the famous aristocratic auto da 
fe of August 4th. However, the very uncertainty about what 'it' was; the fine print which 
restored much of the fiscal substance without the ideological impedimenta; the readiness 
of some to renounce the privileges of others; the fact that it was a tactical manoeuvre 
which got out of control, a belated response to widespread peasant revolts, has led 
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modem historians to question its imponance and pour scorn on the heroic descriptions of 
contemporaries. But once again, contemporary myth had its reasons: it did seem like a 
bonfire of vanities, an electric whirlwind, 'an immonal night in which justice cast out of 
the Temple all the sellers in order to listen freely to the poor, the innocent and the 
oppressed', an anvil on which fraternity had forged a new order which would transform 
social relationships and begin the world anew. It, too, was the first of many ritual 
surrenders: the trunkloads of coin, the religious objects, crosses, statues, sacred ampules 
heaped onto the floor of the Convention in 1793 and 1794.30 
Foundation myths require symbolic rituals, initiation rites, and in the case of the 
French Revolution, the Tennis Coun Oath and its subsequent re-enactments in Feasts of 
Federation (which became a son of mass exercise in oath taking), became an inaugurating 
communion of the new nation, which was at the same time an act of mutual self-
identification. 'We live in a (political) world we ourselves create•.31 Political identity 
thus created cannot be delegated, cannot be exercised by another. As Rousseau always 
insisted, representation is corruption. Putting it for a moment in the terminology used by 
Derrida in his analysis of the metaphysics of presence: 'the legitimizing instance is the 
representer present in person, sovereignty is presence and the delight in presence'; 
corruption the alienation of presence, the general will changed into the transmitted power, 
'the catastrophe of the signifler-representer•.32 Here, it is almost as imponant to notice 
what the oath was not: it was not, of course, a contract made with a pre-existing 
government; it was not a renewal of a mythic pre-Capetian community, of ancient 
libenies or 'binhrights'; it was not a Covenant made with God, the fufllment of a destiny 
or the culmination of process of nation-building.33 It was central to the- 'new order' 
ushered in by the Revolution. The mythology of the Revolution was unremittingly 
secular and- if one may use the expression- presentist. It inhabited what Lynn Hunt has 
aptly called 'the mythic present', the instant of creation of the new community, the sacred 
moment of consensus. 'We have reached', said one ardent spirit in 1789, 'the hean of 
time'. 'The mythic present was inherently undatable' (and hence was always changing: 
Bastille Day, the Immonal Night, the ovenhrow of the monarchy, the execution of the 
king - all of them requiring new festivals, new rituals, new linguistic codes), 'and as a 
consequence the revolution's own history was always in flux', was also inherently 
revolutionary. 34 
The Foundation myths and myths of identity, institutionalized in the festivals and 
popular displays directed by David and Gregoire between 1790 and 1794, became 
something of an ideological refuge in which conflicts between the Revolutionaries could 
be sublimated, where the divisions besetting bourgeois and sans culotte, Parisian and 
provincial, could be dissolved in the new moral community, forged by the new language 
of politics.35 They became a means of distinguishing the Revolution from what was 
now dubbed an 'ancien regime', an old order that preceded the Revolution and which 
environed it still. The 'mythic present' was always engaged in struggle against the past: 
How glorious', declared Joseph Priestley, 'is the prospect, the 
reverse of all that is past which is now opening upon us and upon the 
world.36 
But the demarcation required constant vigilance. For the Revolution lived in a world 
where the relics of the past abounded, as the unreformed members of French society, its 
external enemies, its internal traitors; where the new beginning was constantly threatened 
by the never-ending: hence the coupling of regeneration and conspiracy in the rhetoric 
and iconography of the Revolution. Sarastro's Temple, you may remember, harboured 
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Monastatos: light was always threatened by the shadow, transparency by the veil, free 
space by obstacles, virtue by corruption. 
Let us focus this distaff side of the mythology of the Revolution, for a moment, on the 
unlikely head of Louis XVI. The Revolutionary oath was, of course, a symbolic contrast 
to the annointing of a king: kings traditionally received the 'supernatural insignia of 
power from a transcendent God during the ceremony of consecration•)? Kings were 
made to shine; they became the vehicles through which the light and virtue which came 
from God and which they enjoyed through their elevated blood and status were diffused 
to their subjects. Listen to Louis XIV ('the sun king') for a moment 
The great interval which virtue puts between other men and the king 
exposes him in the most beautiful light and with utmost glitter in the 
eyes of the whole world. All eyes are attached to him alone 
everything else crawls, everything else is impotent and sterile.38 
It is as if until the Revolution, every King preened himself before the same magic mirror 
and saw the same gratifying images: himself as God's deputy, head and soul of the body 
politic, sole knower of the mysteries of state, father of his subjects, husband of the 
realm, healer, peacemaker, sovereign lord.39 The version of Enlightenment mythology 
which equates light with the nation and which locates it in the heart of the citizen cannot 
of course for a moment tolerate any of this:40 'the consecrated despotism of hereditary 
monarchy', the invisible 'unseen thunderbolt' of royal power as one speaker called it at 
Louis' trial, what Burke praised as natural radiance and Paine denigrated as borrowed 
plumage.41 'The Revolution begins', said St Just, 'where the tyrant ends'. And adapting 
the Enlightenment's favourite metaphor to the spectre of conspiracy and backsliding, he 
asked: 
What do you call a Revolution? The fall of a throne, a few blows 
levelled at a few abuses? The moral order is like the physical; abuses 
disappear for an instant as the dew dries in the morning, and as it 
falls again with the night, so the abuses will reappear.42 
The Revolution had always leant heavily on the Manichean element of Enlightenment 
mythology43 and I hope I don't need to labour the polarities: without the Queen of the 
Night there could be no Sarastro. What it does is to couple this with the principle of 
exclusion: the aristocrat is the outsider, the alien, the person who can never identify with 
or create within himself the new moral and political order. This is already the theme of 
Sii:yes' "What is the Third Estate". Now, in the hands of St Just and Robespierre, it is 
given fresh impetus by the infusion of Rousseauist pathos and its moral categories. 
Whereas Charles Stuart was called to account for his actions against 'the ancient and 
fundamental laws and liberties' of his kingdom, was the victim of antiquarian 
fundamentalism, Louis was the emblem of the past at war with the present, someone 
outside 'the sacred moment of consensus', 'the stranger', said St Just, 'in our midst'. He 
was not a citizen, not part of the general will, but rather Monsieur Veto, a rebel against 
the absolute sovereignty of the people. 'Kingship itself is crime', a blasphemy against the 
new philosophy; 'no one can reign innocently', and 'to avenge the murder of the people', 
to atone for a thousand years of tyranny the king must die.44 As with Louis, so too with 
other aliens, strangers, aristocrats, Feuillants, Federes- the list was endless. 
'Words', the Chinese philosophers used to point out, 'are rigid in their form and yet 
endlessly debatable in their meaning•45 The language of the Revolution - and the 
mythical constructions formed by that language - could never be given objective or even 
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widely accepted social content, and could never, for that reason, be successfully 
appropriated by the revolutionary leadership. The course of the Revolution, and 
particularly the Terror, can indeed be seen as an attempt to overcome these ambiguities 
and anomalies, by regulating what could and could not be said, worn, written, thought 
by every citizen. By this stage, myth had dwindled into ideology in the sense that Marx 
gave to the term: a set of ideas that related to reality, not in order to shed light on it or to 
change it, but in order to veil it or to permit its manipulators to say one thing and do 
another. And this was all the more certain since the mythology in question was an 
unstable compound of Enlightenment and expressivist ideas: ideas which in other hands 
could be harnessed to very different purposes. Sarastro's Temple was never meant for 
the sans culotte, and simple hearts were not the malleable complement of philosopher-
revolutionaries. 
For all that, and for all the consequent inadequacy of an account of the Revolution 
which focusses exclusively on its language, symbols and myths, they came to be central 
to the historiography of the Revolution also. The struggle between grace and justice, as 
Michelet called it, between the traditional mandate to rule and the novel categorical 
imperatives of reason and identity, which found their most provocative illustration in the 
episodes I have mentioned and which marked such a decisive severing from the myths of 
the ancien regime, came to constitute its meaning for contemporary observers and for 
subsequent historians. 
The rhetoric of the revolutionaries duly found its response in the most explicit and 
eloquent defence of those myths in the work of Edmund Burke .. Take the following: 
All the pleasing illusions which made power gentle and obedience 
liberal, which harmonized the different shades of life, and which by a 
bland assimilation, incorporated into politics the sentiments which 
beautify and soften private society, are to be dissolved by this new 
conquering empire of light and reason. All the decent drapery of life 
is to be rudely tom off. All the super-added ideas, furnished from the 
wardrobe of a moral imagination, which the heart owns and the 
understanding ratifies as necessary to cover the defects of our naked 
shivering nature, and to raise it to dignity in our own estimation, are 
to be exploded as a ridiculous, absurd and antiquated fashion.46 
One could not hope to find a more complete answer to Sarastro's Temple and 
Rousseau's transparence. In many respects, indeed, and not just because of its polemic, 
his work is rather the swansong of traditionalism than the fountainhead of modem right-
wing ideology. Burke always claimed that his work was descriptive not just prescriptive, 
was an account of the ways in which social thought and practice actually operated, rather 
than an ideological reaction to French principles, that his traditionalism was itself 
traditional.47 
English history, he maintained, constituted a tradition of behaviour encapsulated in the 
accumulated precedent of English law and the transmission of English landed property -
in an elaborate body of myths, which taken together formed the cult of the 'ancient 
constitution', and in a set of historic arrangements based on inheritance. Government, he 
argued, was transmitted 'in the same manner in which we enjoy and transmit our 
property', 'locked fast as in a son of family settlement; grasped as in a type of mortmain 
for ever'. State and society are not so much a biological unity as 'an undying persona 
ficta which secures our liberties by vesting the possession of them in an immortal 
continuity'. Society was a contract but a contract of a peculiar kind, 'a contract in the 
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great primeval contract of eternal society, linking the lower with the higher natures, 
connecting the visible and invisible world, according to a flxed compact which holds all 
physical and moral natures, each in their appointed place'. It was an earthly expression of 
transcendent values. It was 'a partnership not only between those who are living, but 
between those who are living, those who are dead and those who are to be bom'.48 
Burke's Weltanschauung has no place for the discontinuities of the Revolution. 
Modem France, according to its own cultural representations, was born in 1789. The 
Revolution, in other words, was a myth of origin. But it was an identity myth also. 'Any 
account of the Revolution was a discourse on civic identity, any political action an 
elaboration of a history that began in 1789' _49 And at the level of historical discourse, 
also, the myth of the Revolution preceded and infigured its historical placement or 
depiction, flrst in the linguistic protocols of the Revolutionaries themselves or in the 
distaff form enshrined in Burke's analogical rhetoric. In a way, the analysis of Burke and 
his contemporary, Paine was pivotal: as outsiders who were also insiders, polemicists 
who claimed also to be historians, they set much of the subsequent historical agenda. For 
Burke, the Revolution stood for the destruction of a finely structured polity, the 
pulverization of a complex corporate society, a conspiracy of impious intellectuals and 
envious petty bourgeois; for Tom Paine, it saw the substitution of the Rights of the 
Citizen for the wrongs of the subject. Michele! simply presented Paine's version more 
definitively and dramatically in the famous symbolic substitution of Justice for Grace, the 
yielding up of 'Doubting Castle' Bastille and Giant Privilege. Alternatively, in the 
complex version manufactured for 19th century Liberals for whom 1789 was splendid, 
1792 a pity and 1794 anathema, the Revolution was yet another skirmish in an age-old 
struggle between the aristocracy and the middle class, a blow for liberty which turned to 
revenge against the oppressor, or as a bright day dawning, which was perverted by the 
monstrous inheritance of class hatred, centralization and moral inertia 50 
Over and again during the nineteenth century, the Revolution was tailored to suit the 
needs of a notoriously capricious political climate. Even after 1871 with the gradual 
stabilization of politics, when the Revolution was institutionalized51 (and given a special 
Professorship in the Sorbonne), it appeared first in a Republican frockcoat (a polite 
constitutional descent conducted at the level of parliamentary debates - which, 'under 
force of circumstances', went a bit off the rails), but sporting also a populist patriotism 
crystallized around the cult figure of Danton, disculpated from the September massacres 
and cleared of corruption: a Clemenceau before his time. 52 Thence, it progressed through 
a more and more radical laying on of hands, (via a Jacobin-Leninist stage in which a 
political discourse on the Russian Revolution was superimposed upon the events of 1789 
and 1792) with the 'Incorruptible' but also dandified and verbally inscrutable figure of 
Robes pierre as an uncomfortable Socialist saint. 53 And finally it achieved its 
'Sorbonniste' apogee in a more and more anomymously delineated sans-culotte or bras-
nus movement54 (collectivities which sometimes seem to have strayed out of a Museum 
of Communist Realist Art or a rigidly choreographed party ballet for the chosen 
instruments of historical change), their intervention charted in a number of 'Great Leaps 
Forward' known as 'Journees".55 And so to the present day: even so famous, highly 
regarded and still widely used a work as Lefebvre's 'Quatre-Vingt-Neuf, written for the 
!50th anniversary and celebrating the first year of the Revolution as a co-operative labour 
of every section of French society and especially of the alliance between middle class and 
artisan, a sort of 1939 Popular Front before its time, demonstrably belongs to the 
tradition of Republican mythology and Professorial apostolic succession that started with 
Aulard and ended only with the death of Albert Soboul in 1983.56 The view from the 
Right, topographically speaking, further up the Left Bank, from the Faubourg St 
Germain and the Academie rather than the Quartier Latin, is even more clearly mythical 
57 
and far more insubstantial: a rudely interrupted eighteenth century Fete Champetre and a 
gallery of beautiful Queens, long suffering Kings and martyred aristocrats, differing only 
from Burke's rodomontade in its rhetorical hollowness and slick but seedy aroma of 
proto-Fascism and Action Francais e. 
All these myths are discredited according to the 'revisions' of the last twenty or thirty 
years. We can dispense with the idea that there was a Revolution at all, says Alfred 
Cobban; rather there were many Revolutions, few of them progressive, many abortive: a 
revolt of office holders against the administrative structure of the Ancien Regime, of 
peasant proprietors and urban consumers against agrarian reform, of town against 
country and country against town. These contradictory and often overlapping movements 
produced no significant social transformation, no discernible 'modernization', not even 
lasting political change: after all the huffing and puffing, the landscape of French politics 
and society was much the same in 1815 as it had been in 1789.57 Or, according to the 
few Anna/iens who have set their plough to so alien a furrow, it is yet another 'crise eco-
demographique", a dramatic episode in the Early Modern interplay of consumption and 
resources, a sharper than normal pair of Malthusian 'scissors'. Or, in Richard Cobb's 
evocative entertainments, it is the backcloth to an endless variety of droll tales, 'contes 
immoraux', fascinating tit-bits of literary or human value.58 
Much of the smashing of historical idols - of the great Bourgeois Revolution or the 
Foundation of the French State - has been exhilarating; some of it has been long overdue. 
It is repeating a pattern which has occurred in many less traditional historical bastions 
thirty, forty, fifty years ago: 'the English Revolution•,59 'Feudalism', 'the Renaissance', 
'the Industrial Revolution'. Like most iconoclasm it has been characterized by some 
tilting at windmills, some knocking down of straw men - myths have been crudified, 
invented even, the better to be laughed out of academe. And of course, the destruction 
has invariably been advertised as the preliminary to the new work of synthesis: once all 
the regional studies have been completed, another 500 or 5000 theses written, we shall be 
able to put Humpty together again. After all, the worst polemical disagreements are a 
thing of the past: we have moved beyond Michelet and Taine, Mathiez and Gaxotte, and 
'there is good reason to suggest that historical truths eventually will gain general 
acceptance and that judgements about the Revolution will in the long run approach 
agreement'. 60 
It may be so, but I must confess to an unease, to a considerable scepticism. In the late 
50s and early 60s, Cobban's debunking of naive class analysis, of reductionist Marxism 
and homogenized 'modernization' theory, seemed so right; in the early 70s, Richard 
Cobb's burlesques of departed orthodoxies, his sharpness of perception and total absence 
of cant, his effervescent wit and a-politicism, seemed wonderfully exhilarating. But, as 
the years went by and the volumes poured out, I gradually lost my enthusiasm. What did 
it add up to, this 'officier's coup', this pre-emptive 'Poujadiste' strike by the peasantry 
and lumpen-bourgeoisie, this nostalgic tourism, this 'Promenade', this 'laboratory for 
purely existential preference'?6l The critical history of the last twenty years may well 
have substituted for a process that was intelligible and open to criticism, no process at all 
or one that is a mystery, a pursuit of intimations which others cannot follow, a personal 
dialogue between the researcher and the archive. 
When all is said and done, the myth of origin and identity has a place in our 
understanding of the Revolution. To begin with it still retains its position as a semantic 
marker in modern historiography, as a signpost in any large scale narrative of the modern 
world or any comparative analysis of modern thought: as the imagined 'foundation stone' 
of the Modern France, or of bourgeois society. But beyond that, beyond the resonances 
58 
of the Revolution in nineteenth century Liberalism or Conservatism, beyond even its 
pivotal role in the formation of Marxist ideology, 'myth' has another, perhaps a more 
conventionally historical role. In many ways it remains vital to any attempt to restore the 
contingency of the Revolution, and to rescue its participants not just from theoretical 
models of class or from subservience to the imperatives of the state - from the roles 
assigned them in the traditional historiography of the Revolution - but from something 
which may be worse: from the redundancy and the trivialization imposed on their 
language, their emotions, their experiences, their politics, by a modern critical history 
which operates solely under the rubric of de-mystification.62 Perhaps Hegel had a point: 
'behind the curtain of appearances there is nothing to be seen, unless we ourselves go 
there, as much in order that we may thereby see as that there may be something there that 
can be seen·.63 We need the myth of the Revolution in order to see. 
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